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Helicopter pilots' views of air traffic controller responsibilities: A mismatch
Abstract
Controllers and pilots must work together to ensure safe and efficient helicopter flight within the 
London control zone. Subjective ratings of pilot perception of controller responsibility for five 
key flight tasks were obtained from thirty helicopter pilots. Three types of airspace were 
investigated. Results indicate that there is variation in pilot understanding of controller 
responsibility compared to the formal regulations that define controller responsibility. Significant 
differences in the perception of controller responsibility were found for the task of aircraft 
separation in class D airspace and along helicopter routes. Analysis of the patterns of response 
suggests that task type rather than the airspace type may be the key factor. Results are framed 
using the concept of a shared mental model. This research demonstrates that pilots flying in 
complex London airspace, have an expectation of controller responsibility for certain flight tasks, 
in certain airspace types that is not supported by aviation regulation.
Keywords
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Practitioner Summary
The responsibility for tasks during flight varies according to the flight rules used and airspace 
type. Helicopter pilots may attribute responsibility to controllers for tasks when controllers have 
no responsibility as defined by regulation. This variation between pilot perceptions of controller 
responsibility could affect safety within the London control zone.
1. Introduction
Pilots and controllers are part of two operationally independent systems (Hoc and Debernard, 
2002). Working as a team across this complex sociotechnical, system-of-systems the controller-
pilot interface ensures the safe progress of flights (Harris and Stanton, 2010). A key dimension 
of a systems-of-systems is the definition and operation of the interface between the different 
systems (Siemieniuch and Sinclair, 2015). Pilots need to conduct defined tasks to ensure the 
safety of their system. System evolution, driven by a goal of an improved level of safety, has 
defined that from time-to-time, controllers assume responsibility for some of these pilot tasks. 
The transfer of responsibility for a task between the systems, across the interface is defined by 
aviation regulation, which is common, or shared between the pilot and controller systems. A 
shared understanding of who holds responsibility for each of the key tasks under the various 
combinations of task, airspace and flight rules types is essential for the safe and timely transition 
of responsibility of the tasks as the context changes. A task left unmonitored or incomplete can 
result in a degradation of safety.
Systems comprising more than one person have properties over and above those individuals 
making up the system and the various actors within the system may have common elements to 
their understanding which allows them to act in a co-ordinated manner (Dobbins et al, 2015). 
The pilot and controller systems are components of the wider aviation system. Salas et al (1992) 
defined a team as “two or more individuals, who have specific roles, perform interdependent 
tasks, are adaptable and share a common goal” A system can be viewed as a team comprising of 
interacting members forming an integrated whole (Jonker, et al., 2011). There is converging 
evidence that suggests that humans working in teams employ shared mental models to represent 
relevant information about the task. Although teams can be considered as face-to-face groups, 
they can also be geographically distributed individuals communicating using phones, radios, and 
other devices as is the case in the aviation system (Scheutz, M., 2017). A shared mental model 
has been defined as ‘knowledge structures held by team members that enable them to form 
accurate explanations and expectations for the task, and in turn, coordinate their actions and 
adapt their behaviour to the demands of the task and other team members’ (Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1993). When team members can communicate and strategize freely, shared mental models 
may not be so critical to performance (Stout et al., 1999). The team members can discuss the 
next move and does not need to rely on pre-existing knowledge and understanding. Under 
conditions where communication is more difficult or restricted, shared mental models contribute 
to performance as they allow team members to predict the needs and behaviours of others in 
terms of shared expectations (Stout et al., 1999; Pritchett and Midkiff, 1995; Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1993). In the aviation environment controllers and pilots do not tend to engage in free-speech 
because of the imposed highly procedural communication and the limited time available to each 
party. This constrained and procedural communication encourages, and we suggest demands, the 
use of shared mental models. A shared mental model can allow pilots and controllers to draw on 
their own pre-existing knowledge as a basis for predicting the behaviour of the other party and 
selecting actions that are consistent and coordinated (Mathieu et al., 2000; Marks et al., 2000). A 
shared mental model does not imply an identical mental model, but “rather, the crucial 
implication of shared mental model theory is that team members hold compatible mental models 
that lead to common expectations for the task and team” (Canon-Bowers et al., 1993).
In this research, we propose that the understanding of individual responsibilities at this interface 
is informed by a mental model (Carayon et al., 2015). We suggest that compatible mental models 
contribute to a shared mental model generating the common set of expectations described by 
Cannon-Bowers et al. In this article we examine helicopter pilot understanding of controller 
responsibility across a range of tasks. Differences in understanding may affect helicopter pilot 
expectation, confounding the overall shared mental model to which we have alluded.
Key tasks are examined such as maintaining appropriate physical separation from the ground, 
other aircraft, and vertical obstructions such as telecommunication towers and tall buildings. The 
safety of the aircraft is also highly-influenced by the flight being conducted in appropriate 
weather conditions, and the application of the correct set of flight rules by the pilot, for the 
weather encountered. For example, in conditions of good visibility, the pilot will apply Visual 
Flight Rules (VFR), and in conditions of poor visibility, the pilot will apply Instrument Flight 
Rules (IFR). In the latter case, the pilot will fly with sole reference to the cockpit 
instrumentation.
We focus on London airspace defined as the inner and outer areas of the London Control Zone 
and the London City Control Zone. We use structured interviews employing scenarios presenting 
five key tasks in three different airspace types. Pilot expectation was compared against controller 
responsibility as defined by regulation. Differences are explained as variation in the mental-
model of helicopter pilots.
2. Method
2.1 Design
The key tasks were identified from a review of aviation regulation conducted by the authors. 
Aircraft separation, terrain clearance, obstacle clearance, determination of the suitability of the 
weather, and selection of the flight rules were identified (Civil Aviation Authority, 2013; 
European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013). Table 1 summarises these formal responsibilities of 
pilots and controllers. From these tasks, the controller is only responsible for aircraft separation 
within Class A airspace, and aircraft separation for flights conducted under Special VFR. 
[Table 1 near here]
Structured interviews were used to elicit pilot perception of controller responsibility. Participants 
were asked about controller responsibility across the three types of airspace for each of the five 
key tasks identified. Three helicopter flight profiles were developed to stimulate consideration of 
the specific types of airspace and associated procedures and rules. Five questions were developed 
to assess the magnitude of pilot expectation of controller level of responsibility for the tasks. 
Pilots were asked to rate the level of controller responsibility using a visual analogue scale 
(VAS) for each of the five tasks. Visual analogue scales comprise a continuous line with two or 
more labels. These labels are termed ‘scale anchors’ and a VAS must have at least two scale 
anchors at the ends of the line. Participants then mark a point on the line which aligns with their 
subjective view in the context of the question being asked. A distance measurement from one of 
the scale anchors or the mid-point can then be taken representing a value. For example, a typical 
Likert scale: strongly agree, agree etc. could be re-expressed as a VAS with the anchor points 
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. Measurement equivalence between the Likert and VAS 
formats has been demonstrated empirically by Kuhlman et al. (2017). Advantages of the VAS 
approach include greater granularity of response since many Likert scales measure across five or 
seven points. In addition, Likert scales do need to be scaled. The use of considered scale anchors 
increases the wide range of the constructs that can being measured and then reliably exposed to 
statistical procedures that demand interval level data (Reips and Funke, 2008).
2.2 Participants
The study was approved by the University ethics board and informed consent was given prior to 
participation. Thirty participants were recruited opportunistically by approaching helicopter 
companies and helicopter flying schools. A snowball sampling approach was used where 
participants recommended suitable acquaintances. Participants were required to be holders of a 
UK national or EASA helicopter commercial pilot or airline transport pilot licence. Participants 
were broadly divided in half by number of flights conducted. Fifteen participants had conducted 
100 flights or more inside the London airspace within the last 10 years (median = 200, range 100 
– 3000). Fifteen participants had conducted fewer than 100 flights inside London airspace within 
the last 10 years (median= 15, range = 1 - 69). Fourteen participants had held a twin-engine 
helicopter rating within the last 10 years. Fourteen participants had held an instrument rating 
within the last ten years whilst twelve participants held both a twin-engine and an instrument 
rating within the last 10 years.
2.3 Materials 
Flight profiles were developed to anchor participants to specific scenarios. Industry standard 
flight charts and written descriptions of the flight profiles were generated and developed as 
scenario cards. The three flight profiles were a route along Helicopter Route ‘H3’ from Bagshot 
Visual Reporting Point to Battersea Heliport using the standard route and heights, a transit of 
Class D airspace from north-to-south overhead London City Airport at one thousand feet, and a 
direct routing through Class D airspace from Brent Reservoir Visual Reporting Point to Battersea 
Heliport at the standard heights normally directed by Air Traffic Control. The five questions 
relating to the different tasks for each of the scenarios were developed comprising: “Considering 
Flight Profile one [two, three], please indicate how much responsibility you expect the air traffic 
controller to have for (1) terrain separation; (2) obstacle separation; (3) aircraft separation 
from your aircraft; (4) determining the suitability of the weather; (5) determining the flight 
rules?”. A 150 mm Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) was presented to participants to record their 
subjective perception of responsibility. Four equally spaced text anchors were provided beneath 
the VAS representing: not at all responsible, somewhat responsible, mostly responsible, and 
completely responsible. A free text box under each VAS was provided to record participant 
comment if given.
2.4 Procedure
After giving informed consent, demographic data was collected. Participants then answered 
questions about reference sources used to determine who holds responsibility for the key tasks, 
before and during flight. Participants were then presented with answer booklet and a brief 
description of the developed flight profiles together with the scenario card. Participants were 
reminded that all flights were under VFR and that the participant could ask for any question to be 
repeated. For each participant, the five questions were repeated for each of the three types of 
airspace, and all fifteen questions were presented in a randomised order. The participants were 
asked to indicate their magnitude of expectation for controller responsibility for each task within 
each type of airspace by placing a mark on the VAS. Participants were then thanked for their 
participation and debriefed.
3. Results
3.1 Sources of reference used by pilots
The five most frequent sources of reference reported by the participants before a flight to obtain 
information about who is responsible for the key tasks include other pilots (17), aeronautical 
information publication (15), communication with air traffic control (10), air navigation order (4) 
and navigation charts (3). Participants reported four sources of information that they would use 
to obtain information about who was responsible for the key tasks during flight. Recall was 
reported as the most frequent (23) followed by asking the controller (17), navigation charts (6) 
and other, commercial publications (1). The data collected on the use of reference sources to 
define responsibility for the key tasks during flight by pilots indicates that recall and asking the 
controller are used frequently.
3.2 Perception of responsibility scores
Participant scores for expectation of controller responsibility range from zero (not at all 
responsible) to 15 (completely the responsible). The median level of expectation of controller 
responsibility is shown for each of the five tasks within each of the three types of airspace at 
Figure 1. Median levels of responsibility are shown by solid horizontal bars for each task within 
each type of airspace. The edge of the boxes shows the interquartile range and the whiskers show 
minimum and maximum values. Outliers (>1.5 × IQR) are shown as dashes. High variability and 
many outliers are observed across all data indicating variability of perception of controller 
responsibility. Aircraft separation within all types of airspace possessed the highest values of 
pilot expectation of controller responsibility, followed by determination of flight rules.
[Figure 1 near here]
Figure 1: Expectation of Controller Responsibility by Task and Airspace
Examination of the distribution of the data revealed departure from normality. Distributions were 
typically highly skewed towards each end of the scale. This is to be expected since the concept of 
controller responsibility is inherently bipolar. It would be surprising if normally distributed data 
were found since this would indicate a greater level of uncertainty amongst pilots as to whether 
the controller was or was not responsible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests support the visual 
inspections of the distribution and the theoretical position. Significant departures from normality 
were found in each condition. This characteristic of the data precludes the use of parametric 
inferential-statistics for analysis.
To answer the research hypothesis that there will be differences in the expectation of 
responsibility across task and airspace type, two different analyses were conducted. Firstly, 
significance testing was used to establish whether there were significant differences between the 
median responsibility score and the regulatory designation of responsibility allocated to each task 
and airspace combination. Secondly, multidimensional scaling (MDS) was used to understand 
the similarities and differences between responsibility judgements assigned to each task and 
airspace combination.
The median of each task-airspace combination was tested against a value indicating the 
expectation of full controller responsibility or no controller responsibility. Selection of this value 
is not straightforward. Since pilot expectation of responsibility was measured on a visual 
analogue scale of 0 to 15, it is tempting to test against a value of 0 or 15. However, this would 
produce a sharp-null hypothesis, increasing the probability of a Type I Error; a significant effect 
claimed when none exists. Secondly, linear scales are subject to central-tendency bias and 
participants can demonstrate an unwillingness to record a response at the extremes of the scale 
(Foddy, 1993). In summary, a null-hypothesis using 0 or 15 as the test value may say more about 
participant use of the scale than the pattern of pilot expectation of controller responsibility. No 
data in literature is applicable in establishing the extent of this bias on this scale. In order to 
mitigate this bias, conservative test values at the 25th and 75th percentiles of the data were used to 
test the hypothesis. These values correspond to 3.75 and 11.25 on the 0 - 15 scale and require a 
more conservative result from a hypothesis test to evidence a statistically significant difference 
than the use of 0 or 15.
Visual inspection of the variation around the median indicated that the assumption of symmetric 
distribution around the median cannot be supported. A non-parametric one sample test Wilcoxon 
test was considered and subsequently rejected due to its restrictive assumption associated with a 
symmetric distribution of the median differences. A one-sample sign-test does not require 
symmetry around the median and was selected. The reduced set of assumptions used by the sign-
test does reduce the statistical power available to detect small differences and therefore could be 
regarded as a highly conservative test of differences.
All variables were tested against a directional, one-tailed hypothesis using Minitab 17. The null 
hypothesis was aligned with the regulatory locus of responsibility for the task-airspace 
combination. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the median value of the 
responsibility scores is at variance with the regulatory requirement. Aircraft separation in Class 
A airspace is the responsibility of the controller and so a test value of < 11.25 was used. All other 
task and airspace combinations used a test value of > 3.75. A Bonferroni correction was used to 
control the familywise error rate among the fifteen tests, holding α at the conventional 0.05. A 
new critical value of <0.003 was required to achieve significance.
Results of the one-sample sign test indicate significant differences in median of pilot expectation 
of controller responsibility for aircraft separation in Class D airspace and helicopter routes, see 
Table 2. This indicates that pilots tended to assign a greater level of responsibility to controllers 
than defined by the regulations. High variability is also notable in pilot expectation of controller 
responsibility for flight rule determination across all three types of airspace, as evidenced by the 
high number of responses away from the regulatory definition.
[Table 2 near here]
The high variability in responses across all tasks and airspace type warrants further analysis to 
understand the patterns of responses across different tasks and airspace types. Multi-dimensional 
Scaling (MDS) was used to understand the relationships between the patterns of pilot responses, 
presenting these patterns graphically. The PROXimity SCALing (PROXSCAL) algorithm 
available in IBM SPSS 22 was employed to understand relationships between the variables in 
common space (Lewis-Beck et al, 2017). 
Figure 2 shows iterations from one to fourteen dimensions. Higher stress indicates greater 
difficulty in fitting the variables into common space of the related number of dimensions. 
Solutions using more than two-dimensions do not show a significant rise in stress and are 
straightforward to represent graphically. The procedure was re-run specifying two-dimensional 
common space. In MDS, dimensions need not be interpreted as latent or underlying variables. 
The purpose of this techniques to examine similar response patterns in the assignment of 
controller responsibility by the pilot for the five tasks within the three different types of airspace. 
Tentative interpretations of the dimensions are proposed.
[Figure 2 near here]
Figure 2: Normalised Raw Stress by Dimension
In the common space polar-plot at Figure 3, unfilled shapes represent Class A airspace, grey-
filled represent Class D airspace and black-filled represent H-routes. Three groups of responses 
are evident in the common space plot. A group of weather suitability, terrain clearance and 
obstacle clearance tasks have similar patterns of response. Two further groups comprising 
aircraft separation tasks and flight-rule selection tasks are evident.
[Figure 3 near here]
Figure 3: Common Space Plot of Tasks for all Airspace Types
One interpretation of the dimensions is that the horizontal axis represents pilot expectation of 
controller responsibility. Higher expectation of controller responsibility is found to the right of 
the plot. The vertical axis represents a pilot expectation of shared responsibility to varying 
degrees between the pilot and the controller.
Weather suitability, terrain and obstacle clearance are grouped to the left-hand side of the 
vertical axis and close to the origin of the horizontal axis indicating that pilots have a lower 
expectation of controller responsibility and a lower expectation of shared responsibility. 
Interestingly, the task of determining weather suitability for H-routes moves towards a higher 
level of expectation for controller responsibility and a higher level of shared responsibility than 
the other tasks within this group. The task of aircraft separation within Class A airspace is 
defined in regulation as wholly the controller’s responsibility and this is reflected in the high 
value of pilot expectation for controller responsibility displayed. The values for flight rule 
determination are grouped to the right of the vertical axis indicating that pilots have an 
expectation of controller responsibility which is reflected in the controller ability to close 
airspace to flights conducted under VFR. However, the lower values of shared responsibility 
compared to aircraft separation indicate that pilots believe that the responsibility for the task lies 
within the domain of their system. Only the pilot is able to interpret the weather encountered and 
determine the appropriate flight rules.
4. Discussion
This research has revealed variation in helicopter pilot perception of controller responsibility 
inside the London and London City control zones. Results indicate that pilots assign 
responsibility to controllers for separation when flying in both Class D airspace and when in H-
routes. Controllers have no responsibility for aircraft separation within Class D airspace. In H-
routes, London airspace controllers frequently delegate the responsibility of aircraft separation to 
helicopter pilots under a locally developed procedure known as ‘deemed separation’. A high-
level of variation in pilot expectation of controller responsibility was found for terrain and 
obstacle clearance, the determination of weather criteria, and the selection of flight rules across 
all three types of airspace. Aviation regulation defines that controllers have no responsibility for 
these three tasks. The results suggest that pilots have a level of expectation of controller 
responsibility for tasks when the controller is not required to have such responsibility, as defined 
by shared or common regulation. Any level of pilot expectation of controller responsibility 
beyond that defined in regulation could promote a mismatch between what tasks the pilot is 
expecting the controller to take responsibility for, and those tasks that the controller is 
responsible for. For example, one assumption held by pilots could be that a controller is closely 
monitoring the flight profile of the helicopter on radar when not required to do so and would then 
intervene in the event of an unsafe situation developing, for example anticipated loss of 
separation.
This interpretation is supported by the significant differences in the median of pilot expectation 
of controller responsibility for aircraft separation in class D airspace and H-routes. Pilots tended 
to assign a greater level of responsibility to controllers for aircraft separation than defined by the 
regulations, and that they perceive the task as a shared responsibility. This may be related to the 
location of expertise and the radar information with the controller. The blurring of responsibility 
could be an expectation that controllers continue to monitor VFR and Special VFR helicopter 
flights after initial radio contact and permission to enter the zones has been granted. Helicopter 
pilots within London airspace are warned by controllers if they deviate from their designated or 
agreed flight path, and sometimes pilots are reminded of large vertical obstacles and approach 
high-ground by controllers. It may be the case that pilots perceive the flight paths of their 
helicopters to be closely monitored on radar when they are not.
Regulation defines that pilots are responsible for the selection of flight rules within all three 
types of airspace. Although no significant differences in median expectation of responsibility 
were found, the relative values of the responses indicate that pilots hold an expectation that 
controllers have some responsibility for the selection of flight rules, and an expectation that this 
is a shared responsibility. However, controllers can be required to close airspace to VFR traffic 
in conditions of low visibility. This closing action by controllers could be interpreted as a 
weather and flight rule compatibility decisions similar to the judgement that pilots are required to 
make. These controller decisions may lead pilots to have expectation that controllers do 
influence the type of flight rules in use. Such controller decisions may lead pilots to have an 
expectation of controller responsibility for flight rule determination. It could be the case that 
allocation of responsibility, as defined by regulation or local practices for a task is influencing 
the perception of responsibility for the same task within different types of airspace.
The MDS analysis indicates three groupings of response are present within the data. A grouping 
of response for weather suitability, terrain and obstacle clearance suggests that pilots deem 
themselves more responsible for these three key tasks. There is a correspondingly lower level of 
expectation of controller responsibility or shared responsibility for these tasks. 
Regulation defines that the controller is wholly responsible for aircraft separation within Class A 
airspace. The MDS analysis also shows a close grouping of responses for aircraft separation. 
Regulation defines that the controller has no responsibility for aircraft separation within Class D 
airspace and H-Routes but does have full responsibility within Class A airspace. These results 
could indicate that the location of responsibility with the controller for the same task within 
several types of airspace is affecting pilot expectation. The pilot could believe that controller 
access to a radar picture would elicit a level of responsibility from the controller when the 
controller has no formal responsibility. The variation discovered within pilot expectation of 
controller responsibility when no responsibility exists indicates that pilot mental models may not 
be an accurate representation of the aviation regulations. The research indicates that the 
attribution of controller responsibility is more strongly linked with task type than airspace type. 
This mismatch in the pilot mental model could affect the shared mental model across the 
systems.
One limitation of the research is that only the views of pilots have been solicited. To gain the 
fullest possible picture of the operation controllers need to be included in future research. This is 
especially the case if the shared mental model itself is to be formally evaluated. However, our 
results indicate that this is a valuable direction to explore to understand the nature of the pilot-
controller relationship. Another limitation of the research is a change to the classification of 
airspace within the London control zones since conducting this research Class A airspace is no 
longer in use for helicopters under VFR in London. However, the MDS analysis indicates that 
grouping is predominantly associated with task type and not airspace type. As such we assess our 
findings as having relevance in the current airspace configuration.
Our findings lend support for methods that seek to characterise and understand sociotechnical 
systems in greater detail (Waterson et al., 2015). At the very least, the findings further support 
for activities that bring the reference materials and professional learning for system actors: 
controllers and pilots, closer together to ensure to an improved collective understanding. The 
results of this study may evidence the migration of work away from the prescribed rules and 
regulations in response to a complex sociotechnical system which has been subject to change 
over time. Snook refers to this as an ‘uncoupling of praxis’ from rules and procedures (Snook, 
2000). A pattern of working conditions between controllers and pilots has emerged which is 
different from that which is prescribed. This way of working may deliver resilience given the 
current operational landscape but any future change may render such deviation less safe. Joint-
optimisation through increased collaboration at the training and procedural development 
intersection would improve system safety (Kleiner et al., 2015). 
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Key Task Controller Pilot
Aircraft separation in Class A  
Aircraft separation for Special VFR Flight  
Aircraft separation elsewhere  
Terrain clearance  
Obstacle clearance  
Determination of the suitability of the weather  
Determination of the suitability of the flight rules  
Table 1: Allocation of responsibility for key tasks with deemed separation in use.
Airspace Type Task
Hypothesised 
Direction
Cases in 
Hypothesised 
Direction
p (one-tailed)
Terrain Clearance >3.75 7 > 0.990
Obstacle Clearance >3.75 7 > 0.990
Aircraft Separation >3.75 28 < 0.003*
Weather Suitability >3.75 15 = 0.570
H-Routes
Flight-Rule Selection >3.75 17 = 0.292
Terrain Clearance >3.75 8 > 0.990
Obstacle Clearance >3.75 10 > 0.990
Aircraft Separation >3.75 25 < 0.003*
Weather Suitability >3.75 8 > 0.990
Class D
Flight-Rule Selection >3.75 16 = 0.428
Terrain Clearance >3.75 9 > 0.990
Obstacle Clearance >3.75 15 = 0.570
Aircraft Separation <11.25 14 = 0.708
Weather Suitability >3.75 12 = 0.900
Class A
Flight-Rule Selection >3.75 16 = 0.428
Table 2: Sign-test of the median expectation of responsibility (n = 30) 
* indicates significant difference from hypothesised regulatory direction



